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The external crisis, 
adjustment policies 
and agricultural de-
velopment in Brasil 
Fernando Homem 
de Meló* 
At the end of the 1970s the development style based 
on accelerated industrial growth and on moderniza-
tion and expansion of the exports segment of agri-
culture was looking very vulnerable. This was borne 
out by the sharply expansionary economic policy 
adopted in 1979 which generated faster inflation 
against a background of an increased trade deficit and 
a very unfavourable external situation. A first, volun-
tary, adjustment programme designed to control 
aggregate demand proved unworkable and the wor-
sening of the situation led at the end of 1982 to the 
opening of talks with the International Monetary 
Fund. The year 1983 proved the worse in terms of 
economic activity, inflation and declines in the exter-
nal accounts. A programme was agreed with the IMF 
in that year which specified devaluation, elimination 
of subsidized export loans, reduction of imports 
taxes, and wage cuts. 
The existing trends in agriculture did not 
undergo any great changes, Export production rose 
slightly and irregularly, and there was a large drop in 
the output of basic foods, especially cassava and pota-
toes. A new and important development was the 
spectacular growth of sugar cane production as a 
result of the incentives provided in a special govern-
ment programme. At another level, the austerity 
policies entailed a sharp reduction in lending to the 
sector, and the use of fertilizers and insecticides 
declined accordingly, as did the production of 
tractors. 
Economic growth, domestic demand and food 
production recovered in 1984 and did even better in 
1985. Nevertheless, food production remained 
below the 1980 levels in per capita terms. Thus one 
of the main challenges facing Brazil's agriculture is 
to increase its output of low-cost foodstuffs and 
reduce the gap between the exports segment and the 
production of basic foods for home consumption 
—which will necessarily involve the introduction of 
new technologies. 
•Economist. Consultant to the Joint IiCI.AC/l:AO 
Agriculture Division. 
I 
The economy and 
agriculture in 
the 1970s 
1. Overall performance 
The Brazilian economy experienced sustained 
growth between the end of the Second World 
War and the end of the 1970s. The total gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate 
of 6.8% a year between 1950 and 1980. The 
industry sector contributed 7.9% of this growth 
and agriculture 4.7%. These growth rates meant 
that the GDP increased in turn by an annual 
average of 3-9%. 
These results were due among other factors 
to the strategy pursued by Brazil, which was 
based first, for almost two decades (the 1950s 
and 1960s), on the substitution of imports of 
industrial goods, and then, from the end of the 
1960s, on the promotion of exports. 
Two stages can be identified in this latter 
period: the so-called "economic miracle" (1968-
1974) when the gross domestic product grew at 
between 8.3% and 14% a year; and the post-
miracle stage (1975-1980) which saw a consider-
able drop in the growth rate, with levels of 4.8% 
to 9.7%, a decline due to the loss of vigour in the 
industry sector. The figures for Sâo Paulo illus-
trate the decline in the growth rates of industrial 
employment —from 10% a year between 1970 
and 1973, when the "miracle" was at its peak, to 
a final level of 2.5% a year in 1977-1980. 
Furthermore, the total population grew at a 
rate of 2.5% a year between 1970 and 1980, but 
the urban growth was 4.5%. The working popu-
lation, which started at 31.7% of the total, had 
increased to 36.8% by 1980. The changes in the 
sectoral distribution of the population were due 
to the dynamism of industrial activities and to 
the modernization of a large segment of 
agriculture. 
The data given below on the distribution of 
the economically active population illustrate this 
situation for 1970-1980. 

























The sectoral contributions to the GDP 
evolved as follows: 
1970 1980 
Agriculture 10.2 13.0 
Industry 35.8 34.0 
Services 54.0 53.0 
As can be seen, even though industry is the 
largest sector, agriculture developed favourably. 
During the stage of higher growth (1968-
1974) inflation fell from 24.8% to 14.8%. It 
must be pointed out, however, that in the period 
immediately before 1968 the country had been 
subjected to a stringent programme of economic 
adjustment. Idle industrial capacity began to run 
out in 1974-1978, and the economy also suffered 
the impact of the first oil price rises. As a result, 
inflation accelerated between these two years 
from 27.8% to 42.7%. It reached 53.9% in 1979 
and in 1980 the process became hard to control 
as inflation hit 100.2%. But the worst was yet to 
come: the second oil price shock, an economy 
very close to full employment, major crop losses 
and a maximum devaluation of the cruzeiro 
boosted the inflation rate to 109.9% in 1981 and 
then to over 200% a year in 1982. 
The issue of the foreign debt played a very 
important role in the genesis of the crisis which 
occurred at the beginning of the 1980s. The 
problem had in fact begun before the first oil 
price increase and was connected with Brazil's 
strategy of borrowing in the international finan-
cial market to meet the requirements of growth 
while at the same time maintaining a high level 
of reserves. The way of guaranteeing an ade-
quate flow of resources in the following years, 
according to this strategy, was to increase 
exports and the level of reserves itself. 
In 1973 Brazil had its external account in 
bralance and its total foreign debt amounted to 
US$12 000 million. This debt had risen to 
US$43 510 million by 1978, largely as a result of 
the increases in the price of oil. The economy 
then became steadily more vulnerable to 
increases in the oil price and in the interest rates 
which it had to pay abroad. 
The year 1979 marked the onset of a very 
unfavourable period for the country. The second 
oil shock occurred, nominal and real interest 
rates rose sharply in the international market, 
and the terms of trade showed a sharp decline. 
The United States prime rate moved from 
11.75% in December 1978 to 15.25% a year 
later and finally to 21.5% in December 1980. 
The price of the barrel of oil rose from 12 to 34 
dollars, and the terms of trade deteriorated by 
38% between 1978 and 1982 as a result of the 
fall in world trade. 
The impact of these changes was reflected in 
increases in foreign payments of interests from 
US$2 700 million in 1978 to US$9 160 million 
in 1981 and to US$11 360 million in 1982. At the 
end of 1982 the foreign debt stood at around 
US$70 000 million. 
2. Developments in agriculture 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s agriculture 
underwent profound changes in its production 
structure owing to the different rates of growth 
of export crops and those destined to satisfy the 
home demand for basic foods. 
Up to the 1960s agriculture had maintained 
a reasonable balance in its output of these two 
items. The situation began to change rapidly at 
the end of the decade when priority was given to 
a growth model based primarily on export crops. 
In these circumstances preference was given to 
policies that promoted the modernization of 
agriculture, a process which by virtue of its well 
known characteristics was concentrated on 
export crops to the detriment of crops for home 
consumption. 
Important events in this process were the 
rapid growth of soybean production in the 
southern region and, at the other extreme, the 
stagnation of rice and maize production, 
together with the simultaneous decline in cas-
sava and beans. The highest growth rates of per 
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capita output were recorded by soybeans, orange 
juice, sugar cane, tobacco and cocoa. 
The factors which determined the realloca-
tion of resources in favour of export crops were: 
the exchange-rate policy which came into force 
in 1968, based on frequent minidevaluations 
which produced favourable shifts in the real pri-
ces of these items; a period of very favourable 
international prices which lasted until the mid-
1970s; and the model of technological moderni-
zation which spread very rapidly among export 
crops, particularly soybeans. 
As already pointed out, the most vigorous 
expansion was in soybeans, a crop which 
increased from an average of 748 000 ha in 1967-
1970 to 8 548 000 ha in 1979-1980. Growth of 
this kind caused intense competition in land use. 
The high profitability of this activity led to the 
displacement of traditional crops, especially 
basic food crops, in the south of the country. 
This high profitability was due to interna-
tional prices, the heavy demand, and the modern 
technology used in soybean cultivation which led 
to increased productivity and lower marginal 
costs. 
Study of the country's experience shows that 
the only way of re-establishing balance between 
export crops and those produced to meet the 
home demand would be to raise the prices of 
foodstuffs to levels that would make them 
equally profitable. 
On the other hand, the radical changes 
which took-place in the production structure in 
1967-1979 are an example of the flexibility tradi-
tionally shown by the big owners in reallocating 
their resources between these two types of crop 
in accordance with economic conditions. 
As a result of this process the sector's per 
capita gross domestic product rose 6.2%. Owing 
to the changes, the relative share of export pro-
duction in the sector's product increased from 
10.7% in I960 to 13-3% in 1970,20.2% in 1975, 
and 20.2% in 1980. 
A major change also occurred in the compo-
sition of exports. Exports were based mainly on 
coffee, sugar, cotton, tobacco and cocoa, and they 
showed greater diversification owing to the 
incorporation of soybeans and orange juice and, 
later, chicken meat and beef. 
As a counterpart of these developments it is 
important to remember the unsatisfactory bal-
ance in the per capita food supply. Calories 
increased by 0.83% as an annual average 
between 1967 and 1979- This level was due to 
increases of 2.54% in the sugar supply, 4.98% in 
wheat, and 1.23% in livestock production, but it 
concealed a decline of 1.34% a year in the contri-
bution of basic foods. 
If the five main food crops are taken into 
account (rice, maize, cassava, beans and pota-
toes), the calorie ration falls by 2.06% a year and 
proteins by 1.49%. 
Accordingly, the contribution of small 
owners to total production fell; their share was 
52% in 1970 and by 1980 it had fallen to 43%. 
Similarly, the number of small producers, which 
had increased from 1940 to 1970, declined in the 
decade of the 1970s, with a consequent increase 
in the average farm size from 60 to 72 ha. 
3. Problems 'at the end of the decade 
Brazil's economic and social situation was not an 
easy one at the end of the 1970s. The country's 
main problems had to do with the development 
style it had adopted. Growth based on rapid 
industrial development by means of imports 
substitution and the generation of new exports 
and on agricultural growth centered on the 
expansion of the modern segment had become 
extremely vulnerable and at the same time had 
left serious problems unsolved. 
Some indicators illustrate clearly the situa-
tion at the end of the 1970s: 
Foreign debt {millions of dollars): 1973 12 600 
1978 43 510 
1982 69 650 
December prime rate: 1978 11.759? 
1979 15.25'/? 
1980 21.509? 
Terms of trade: deterioration of 38% between 1978 and 
1982. 
Inflation increased by: 1979 53.99? 
1980 100.2% 
1981 109.99? 
Trade balance: deficit of almost USS3 000 million in 1979 
and 1980. 
Reserves (millions of dollars) fell by: 1978 11 895 
1979 9 689 
1980 6 192 
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Balance of payments: the deficit increased, 
Poverty: 31.8% of rural families in 1974-1975 
28.2% of urban families 
Regional imbalances: North-East 45.1% of rural families 
were poor 
South 14.7% idem 
Sao Paulo 22.7% idem. 
In view of the critical situation described above, 
the authorities introduced at the end of 1980 a 
"voluntary" adjustment programme with the 
goal of restoring internal and external balance. 
The measures adopted, in particular the mone-
tary cutback supported by a policy of "soft" deva-
luation, had the main objective of controlling 
aggregate demand. Briefly, these measures were 
the following: Í) reduction of the stock of money 
by 3 % between April 1979 and April 1980 and 
by 29% between May 1979 and May 1980; 
ii) cutback in lending to the private sector; 
iü) devaluations. The policy was not clear in this 
respect, but it was designed to stimulate exports 
and make imports dearer, restricting oil deriva-
tives most of all. The maxidevaluation of 30% in 
December 1979 was followed by a further one of 
30% in February 1983; and iv) specific steps 
were taken to limit imports and stimulate 
exports. 
The results of the implementation of the 
adjustment programme were briefly as follows: 
i) the gross domestic product fell 1.6% in 1981, 
rose 0.9% in 1982 and fell 3.2% in 1983, with a 
consequent drop in per capita GDP; ii) inflation 
slowed down from 121.2% to 91-2% between 
March 1981 and May 1982; ni) exports increased 
between 1980 and 1981 from US$20 132 million 
to US$23 680 million, and imports fell slightly 
from US$22 955 million to US$22 086 million, 
as a result of which the balance of payments 
improved. The situation worsened again at the 
end of 1982 and in 1983 exports fell by 14.7%; 
The new Government which took power in 
1979 adopted an extremely expansionist policy. 
The result was the immediate launching of an 
inflationary spiral which reached 100% in 1980. 
To this was added the increase in the trade deficit 
and an extremely unfavourable external 
situation. 
iv) the current account deficit of the balance of 
payments moved from US$12 800 million in 
1980 to US$11700 million in 1981 and to 
US$16 300 million in 1982; and v) the interest 
on the debt increased from US$ 10 300 million in 
1981 to US$12 600 million in 1982. 
The deterioration of the economic situation 
showed that the voluntary adjustment which the 
Government was trying to make was unworka-
ble. From the second half of 1982 the need was 
realized for a closer link between exchange-rate 
policy and the external imbalances, owing to 
which, despite the devaluations made, the cru-
zeiro had been revalued as a result of the severe 
inflation and the fluctuations in the value of the 
dollar. In November of that same year a decision 
was taken to open negotiations with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund at a time when the debt 
burden was impeding the recovery. 1983 was the 
worst year for economic activity: GDP fell 3.2% 
and inflation rose to around 200%. In view of 
this situation, an attempt was made to imple-
ment a more effective exchange-rate policy 
which would' restore control over the external 
accounts. 
The programme agreed with the IMF envis-
aged the following measures: i) monthly deva-
luation of 1% above the domestic inflation rate, 
which was later followed by a maxidevaluation 
of 2 3 % plus monthly adjustments; ii) elimina-
tion of export subsidies and credits; and iii) re-
duction of wages (by decree in July 1983). 
II 
The adjustment programmes and policies 
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The results obtained can be summarized as 
follows: 
a) Overall 
i) Improvement of the trade balance: 
US$1 594 million in 1981, US$807 million 
in 1982, and US$6 472 million in 1983. This 
last figure was due to the reduction of 
imports by 20.5% and the increase of 
exports by 8.3%. In 1984 there was a balance 
of US$13 068 million owing to the recovery 
of the United States economy. 
ii) The current account of the balance of pay-
ments moved in two years from a deficit of 
US$16 310 million to a surplus of 
US$44 800 million. 
iii) The ratio of exchange rate to wages rose 
from 60% in 1982 to 75% in 1983. 
iv) The industrial GDP (Sao Paulo) fell 15.8% 
between 1980 and 1983. 
v) Employment (Sâo Paulo) fell by 22.1% 
between 1980 and 1984. 
vi) Wages (Sâo Paulo) fell by 35.8% in 1980-
1984 despite a strong rise in 1981, the first 
year of the recession. 
b) Agriculture and food 
i) The production of basic foods fell in 1977-
As already indicated, at the end of the 1970s 
there was a clear division in Brazil's agriculture 
between a modern sector linked to the external 
market and a sector producing food for the home 
market. Changes in the international economic 
variables affected this situation, especially in the 
first half of 1985. Agriculture's performance is 
therefore analysed by type of crop for the period 
1977-1985. 
Five groups are considered in the analysis: 
crops for the home market; export crops, with 
two subgroups; sugar cane; and meat. The avail-
able information gives the following picture: 
1984. In 1978, 1979 and 1983 this perfor-
mance was due to the weather. The per 
capita production of maize, rice, cassava, 
beans and potatoes declined by 1.94% a year 
between 1977 and 1984, and there has been 
no return to the 1977 levels. 
ii) The apparent supply, i.e., production plus 
imports and variation of stocks minus 
exports, fell by 1.73% for these same items. 
When meat and wheat are included, the fall 
was 1.66%. 
iii) The producer prices of the basic crops 
increased only in 1980, by 13-7% over 1977 
in real terms. 
iv) The consumer prices of basic foods rose in 
1983 and 1984 as a result of harvest short-
falls locally and in the United States. 
v) The international prices of tradeable goods 
also fell, although they subsequently made a 
partial recovery. 
vi) Rural wages declined in real terms, i.e., 
when deflated by the GPI or by Sao Paulo 
FPI. The best years for wage-earners were 
1981 and 1982 owing to the lower food pri-
ces. Oddly, the food purchasing power of 
waged workers improved in the middle of 
the recession. This situation was reversed in 
1983 and 1984 by the contraction of the food 
supply and the rise in international prices. 
Í) Unusual growth (7.84% a year) in sugar 
cane production as a result of the incentives 
provided in the PROALCOHOI. programme. 
ii) Moderate (2.5%) and irregular growth in 
exportable crops, with an increase ¡n 1980, 
declines in the next two years, and a further 
increase between 1983 and 1985 owing to 
the recovery (both of output and of the area 
sown) of soybeans. 
iii) Large increase (9.28%) in the production of 
chickens for domestic consumption and for 
export. 
iv) Large drop in the production of basic foods, 
III 
Effects of the adjustment policy on agriculture 
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which had already begun in the 1970s. The i 
largest declines were in cassava and < 
potatoes. i 
There was a small cumulative annual 
increase of 0.91 % in the area cultivated, consid-
erably lower than the historical rate of 3.46% a 
year recorded in 1940-1980. It is important to 
point out that sugar cane was virtually the only 
reason for the expansion of the area by 
2 100 000 ha, of which about 6 3 % was in Sao ¡ 
Paulo. It must be remembered that this crop was 
the object of one of the biggest programmes ever 
carried out in Brazil and it enjoyed major subsi-
dies both in its cultivation and in its processing. 
The area growing basic food crops increased only 
in 1982; in the other years it was below the 1977 
level. In contrast, in 1980 export crops increased 
by 14.1% over 1977, but they then declined in i 
the following years. 
The yields of export crops improved, espe-
cially in the southern and central-southern i 
regions, while, basic food crops remained 
unchanged, with the lowest levels found in the 
north-east and the best results produced by 
maize and irrigated rice in the south, together 
with potatoes and tomatoes. The increases in 
sugar cane were attributable to the very favoura-
ble policy pursued for this crop. 
According to the available data on inputs, 
the use of fertilizers fell by 46% between 1980 
and 1983. The manufacture of tractors fell by 
6 1 % in the same period. Both these inputs then 
recovered in 1984, but without returning to the 
levels of 1979-1980. 
The tight monetary policy introduced at the 
end of 1980 meant a considerable loss of financ-
The economic recovery, first moderate in 1984 
and then stronger during 1985, which coincided 
with the political changes of that year, was one of 
the most important factors in the recovery of 
agriculture, for it strengthened the domestic 
demand for foodstuffs. The improvement in 
ing for agriculture. Resources for lending to pro-
ducers fell by 59% between 1979 and 1984, and 
this situation was only partly corrected in 1985. 
At the same time interest rate subsidies also 
declined considerably. It is thought that credit 
restrictions were one of the reasons for agricul-
ture's poor performance during the period. 
The worst results in export crops were for 
coffee, which suffered # sharp drop in its real 
prices as well as a worsening of its terms of trade 
between 1977 and 1982. 
A summary is given below of the main fac-
tors which impeded the normal development of 
agriculture, by group of crops. 
1. Food crops 
i) The recession and the low per capita 
incomes caused a decline in relative producer 
prices. 
ii) The recession deepened, and imports fell 
owing to the balance of payments crisis; this 
forced prices up. An additional factor was 
the poor harvests in 1983. 
2. Exportable crops 
Í) The adverse factors included the drop in 
international prices in 1979-1982, the 
decline in trade flows, the higher interest 
rates, the revaluation of the dollar, and the 
surplus supply. 
ii) The favourable factors included the 
improved yields, the 1983 and subsequent 
maxidevaluations, and the recovery of inter-
national prices. 
international prices during 1983-1984 came to a 
stop in 1985 and was reversed in 1986. It must be 
stressed that although the weather was particu-
larly propitious in 1985, the per capita produc-
tion of basic foods was nevertheless 14.6% lower 
than in 1977 and 6% below the 1980 level. The 
IV 
Agriculture in 1985 and 1986 
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food supply was smaller in 1977 and 1980 by 
10.5% and 9.9% respectively. 
While the economy grew thanks to exports 
and their multiplier effects and the fuller use of 
installed capacity (8% in 1985 and between 8% 
and 9% in 1986), inflation broke out again and 
reached levels between 217% and235% in 1985 
and 305% in 1986. This was due in part to the 
drought in late 1985 and early 1986. The mone-
tary reform introduced in 1986 proved an effec-
tive counter to inflation. 
Faced with this situation, the Government 
implemented its National Development Plan 
1986-1989, the main goals of which were growth 
and equity; agriculture was assigned a key role, 
especially with respect to the production of basic 
foods. Other objectives were the improvement 
of employment and wages and the balance of 
payments. It was against this background that 
the monetary reform was introduced in February 
1986, stipulating the freezing of prices, the elim-
ination of indexing from contracts, and compul-
sory saving to finance growth. 
At the same time as the recovery of domestic 
demand, which stimulated supply, there was a 
new drop in international prices, followed by the 
1983-1984 recovery. The production of basic 
foods remained a bottleneck despite showing 
The first point is the transfer of resources abroad 
in payment of the debt. In 1984 2.4% of GDP 
went abroad, in 1985 5.2% (equivalent to 
US$11 375 million), and in 1986 4.6%. The 
resources transferred in 1985 were seven times 
greater than those allocated to the Govern-
ment's social programmes. 
The Federal Government's Plan de Metas 
(Targets Plan) provides for public investment to 
be financed by mandatory loans to the Govern-
ment. There are doubts as to the validity of the 
estimates of the savings requirement. 
Furthermore, the trade surplus can be 
ploughed back to finance food imports to supple-
some improvement, and food imports had to be 
increased to cover the deficit. This was possible 
thanks to the favourable balance of payments. 
The Government gave priority to the pro-
duction of basic foods and took steps to Í) stabil-
ize producer prices and incomes; ii) increase the 
yields of basic crops and improve the training of 
human resources; iii) expand the area under cul-
tivation; iv) upgrade the infrastructure; v) im-
plement the agrarian reform; and vi) increase 
the resources for lending and insurance. 
The following specific measures were also 
introduced: i) guaranteed prices for the five 
basic products for three years; ii) increased lend-
ing (by a real 30%) for investment and operat-
ing and marketing costs; iii) public investment 
in storage, drying, transport and irrigation; 
iv) establishment of buffer stocks; and v) less 
State intervention in the marketing of tradeable 
goods. 
The aim of this policy was to reduce the 
variations in producer prices in order to stimu-
late investment and thus to increase supply, 
especially of foodstuffs. The method was to 
assign agriculture responsibility for contributing 
to the restoration of domestic balance by produc-
ing a sufficient food supply, and of external bal-
ance by increasing the sector's exports. 
ment the domestic supply and meet the require-
ments of growth. Part of this surplus should also 
be used for payment of interest on the debt. 
At another level there are the structural fac-
tors, of which the following deserve mention: 
i) Poverty. In 1982 61.5% of the workforce 
earned less than two minimum wages. In 
1985 20% of the population lived in a state 
of extreme poverty. 
ii) Employment. Employment in agriculture 
fell between 1975 and 1980 at a cumulative 
annual rate of 1 %. There was also a consid-
erable increase in temporary work. 
iii) The fragmented nature of agriculture, which 
V 
Main restrictions and challenges for the future 
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causes great technological inequality 
between the production of basic foods and 
production for export. 
Given this situation, the great challenge to 
Brazil's agriculture is to increase the production 
of low-cost food, which implies the introduction 
of more technology, for the benefit of both pro-
ducers and consumers. 
